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1. Introduction 
The successful implementation of supply chain management depends on many soft issues 
(strategic/behavioural) such as organizational resistance to change, inter-functional 
conflicts, joint production planning, profit sharing, team oriented performance measures, 
channel power shift, information sharing, real time communication, inventory and technical 
compatibility (Min & Zhou 2002). Many of the above issues in SCM are conceptually 
addressed and lot of scope exists for improving the performance of SC with good modelling. 
The soft issues of supply chain models can be dealt through proper information sharing, 
communication and coordination between the stages of supply chain. Vendor managed 
inventory (VMI) is a proven concept for successful collaborative and cooperative 
agreements in supply chain. While research has been slowly increasing in the area of vendor 
managed inventory, it has received very little attention in current operations literature. This 
chapter focuses on the soft issues of profit sharing and pricing under vendor managed 
inventory systems. Two vital parameters that govern the operation of a supply chain are: 
sales price at buyers market, and contract price between vendor and buyer. Sales price is 
significant in the sense that it determines the overall profit of the supply chain, referred here 
as channel profit. This chapter proposes five mathematical models under VMI environment 
for determination of optimal sales quantity for each buyer which maximizes the channel 
profit and subsequently to derive the sales and contract price from the optimal sales 
quantity. 
2. Two-echelon supply chains 
In the present internet / E-commerce arena, the stages in SC are less and the manufacturers 
access the customer requirement through retailers. Dell computers have reoriented its 
strategy by reducing it’s down-stream stages and sells through its retail outlets in a 
particular region (Chopra, 2003). Procter and Gamble manages, monitors and replenishes its 
FMCG products in Wal-Mart stores (Clark & Croson, 1994). The success stories of these 
Giants have led the researchers to concentrate on two-echelon supply chain (Cachon & 
Zipkin, 1999). The two-echelon can be considered sequentially between any two of these 
stages such as suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and end-
customer. There are three types of environments addressed in two-echelon SC and they are:  
Source: Supply Chain,Theory and Applications, Book edited by: Vedran Kordic, ISBN 978-3-902613-22-6, pp. 558, February 2008, I-Tech Education and Publishing, Vienna, Austria
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i. Single vendor-single buyer (Banerjee, 1986; Goyal, 1997; Hill, 1997; Viswanathan, 1998; 
Bhattacharjee & Ramesh, 2000; Goyal & Nebebe, 2000; Hoque & Goyal, 2000; Dong & 
Xu, 2002; Lee & Chu, 2005),  
ii. Single vendor-multiple buyers (Lu 1995; Gavirneni, 2001 and Yao & Chiou 2004) and  
iii. Multiple vendors - multiple buyers (Cachon, 2001; Minner 2003; Sedarage et al., 1999; 
Ganeshan, 1999).  
The above three environments addressed by the numerous researchers were operating 
under independent mode with various objectives. Single vendor-single buyer is considered 
as an idealistic one in dealing with bottleneck cases and the remaining two cases represent 
the most practical situations. This chapter proposes five types of environments in two-
echelon supply chain model operating under vendor managed inventory mode as given 
below (Nachiappan et al. 2006; Nachiappan & Jawahar 2007; Nachiappan et al. 2007; 
Nachiappan et al. 2007a). The parameters involved are explained at the end of the model 
description. 
i. Single Vendor Single Buyer (SV_SB) 
The single vendor single buyer as shown in figure1 is known as an idealistic case.  
Figure 1 SV_SB Model 
ii. Single Vendor Multiple Buyer’s (SV_MB) 
Single vendor multiple buyer’s case is shown in figure 2. Few examples for this case cases 
are: Tamilnadu Cooperative milk producer’s federation limited (AAVIN) Madurai, India 
(Single Vendor) selling its milk products to 423 commission agents (Multiple Buyers) in and 
around Madurai; Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Cochin, India (Single Vendor) distributing 
its petroleum products to 2500 sales points (Multiple Buyers) in southern part of India.   
iii. Single Vendor Multiple Buyer’s with Outsourcing (SV_MBO) 
When the cumulative demand of all buyers goes up more than the vendor capacity, 
outsourcing is the option for the vendor to satisfy buyer’s demand. Nowadays outsourcing 
is becoming part of regular activity in both manufacturing organizations and service 
providers. 
Globalization pushes both of them into highly competitive environment. Outsourcing 
occurs because a firm may find it less profitable or not feasible to produce all required 
capabilities in-house. Outsourcing is an acceptable strategy to meet the excess demands than 
the limited capacity of the vendor. Outsourcing incorporated with SV_MB model, operating 
under VMI mode as shown in figure 3 is referred as Single Vendor Multiple Buyers with 
Outsourcing (SV_MBO) 
a1 
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 Figure 2. SV_MB model 
 
 
Figure 3. SV_MBO Model 
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iv. Multiple Vendors Multiple Buyers (MV_MB) 
Few examples of multiple vendors multiple buyers as shown in figure 4 are as follows: Gold 
suppliers (Multiple Vendors) are selling gold through thousands of retailer’s network 
(Multiple Buyers) and numerous grain suppliers (Multiple Vendors) supplying grains 
through thousands of retailers (Multiple Buyers).  
 
Figure 4. MV_MB model 
v. Multiple Vendors Multiple Buyers with Outsourcing (MV_MBO) 
Similar to SV_MBO whenever the cumulative demand of all buyers exceeds the capacity of 
all vendors, outsourcing is the only option for the vendors to satisfy the buyers demand. The 
MV_MB model with outsourcing (MV_MBO) is shown in figure 5.  
Model Parameters 
The demand pattern, sales quantity range at the buyers end and the importance of contract 
price between vendor(s) and buyer(s) are given below  
Demand Pattern: The sales quantity of any product at a particular location is greatly 
influenced by its sales price‘P(yj)’ (Waller et. al., 2001). It depends on the factors such as 
necessity of the commodity (essential or occasional), purchasing power of the customers and 
nature of the product (perishable or storable). The general observation is that the higher 
sales price results low sales quantity and vice versa, provided the reputation and history of 
the company or brand value have no greater impact on the customers and/or there is at 
least one stiff customer (local or global) to control the sales price. 
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Figure 5. MV_MBO model 
Figure 6. Relationship between sales price and sales quantity 
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Taking into account the above for consideration, the relationship between ‘P(yj)’ and ‘yj’ may 
be assumed to behave linearly (Lau & Lau, 2003) and is given as: 
 P(yj) = aj – bjyj    (1)  
Where, aj and bj are the intercept of ‘P(yj)' axis and the slope of sales quantity /curve 
respectively in the sales price vs sales quantity graph shown in figure 6. This becomes the 
demand function for the buyer 
Sales Quantity Range: Sales quantity lies between a specific range between yjmin and yjmax and 
the validity of the assumption of linear demand function holds very well within this range.  
 Contract Price: Contract Price (wij) is a price mutually agreed between ith vendor and jth 
buyer which decide the profits of both vendor and buyer and hence it is considered as vital. 
Usually it lies between sales price and cost of manufacturing. Nature of the product, 
demand and logistic cost play critically in the fixation of contract price. The commodities 
that have good reputation and high demand are usually fast moving and involve low risk 
(probability of loss). In these circumstances, the buyer accepts the contract price closer to 
sales price, even with meager margin on the reasons stated as: Loss due to obsolescence is 
negligible; Non availability of the commodity results in loss of customers that would 
definitely reduce the overall turnover of the outlet; Storage/Holding cost is normally low. 
However in an another scenario, where the product is new and demand is not yet stabilized, 
the contract price is expected to settle at a lower level, closer to cost of production. The 
possible reasons are: Outlets of the commodity take the task of promoting the new product; 
Cost of inventory is expected to be high. In such cases, ethical issues like cooperation, 
revenue and knowledge sharing are needed to compete with the existing commodity and 
consolidate its market. The above discussions point out that contract price is a variable, 
which is dependent on location, competitiveness of the products and production and 
operational costs between vendor and buyer. This shows that contract price play a vital role 
in the context of revenue sharing. 
3. Vendor managed inventory 
The soft issues of SC models can be dealt through proper information sharing, 
communication and coordination between the stages of SC. Examples of collaborative and 
cooperative agreements come in many forms and by many names, including Continuous 
Replenishment (CR), Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), Collaborative Forecasting, 
Planning and Replenishment (CFPR) and Information Sharing Programs (ISP). The overall 
goal shared by all these programs is to reduce costs and to increase efficiency in the SC by 
sharing the information and/or by the transfer of decision rights (Mishra & Raghunathan, 
2004; Fry, 2002; Ballou et al., 2000; Hammond, 1990). VMI is a proven concept for successful 
collaborative and cooperative agreements in SC. The core concept of VMI has been that the 
supplier monitors the customers’ demand and inventory and replenishes that inventory as 
needed with no action on the part of the customer (Dong & Xu, 2002 ; Disney & Towill, 
2002). Waller et al. (2001) noted that the main advantages of VMI were reduced costs and 
increased customer service levels to one or both of the participating members. VMI, 
however, has received very little attention in current operations’ literature, particularly 
operations texts, but it has been widely recognized by industry leaders, such as Wal-Mart 
and the Campbell soup company for creating a competitive advantage. Franchise 
organizations have also made use of VMI to provide a higher level of operating efficiency 
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(Williams, 2000). Cetinkaya & Lee (2000) noted that, with VMI, inventory carrying costs 
were generally reduced, as were stock out problems while the approach offered the ability 
to synchronise inventory and transportation decisions. VMI has differed from a fixed-order 
interval model or a fixed-order quantity model in that neither the time nor the quantity of 
replenishment was necessarily fixed. The supplier was responsible for managing the 
inventory at the customer’s location, generally using information technology, and for 
sending the correct amount at the correct time (Burke, 1996; Parks & Popolillo, 1999). While 
research has been slowly increasing in the area of VMI, certain segments of business have 
appeared to be getting less attention than others (Latamore & Benton, 1999). The SC’s of 
large retail and manufacturing organizations have been the foci of most of the research. 
Mabert & Venkataramanan (1998) pointed out that little work had been carried out in 
applying SCM techniques to service sectors. Therefore this chapter concentrates on VMI systems 
for two-echelon models in the service sectors. 
3.1 Mathematical representation of vendor operations and costs  
The relationship between two partners in any two-echelon supply chain model under VMI 
mode of operation with the various activities, mutual agreement, knowledge sharing and 
cooperation is shown in figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Operation mode of VMI systems with Outsourcing 
3.1.1 Responsibility of the vendor  
Vendor shares more responsibilities than buyer and acts as a leader. Vendor monitors, 
manages and replenishes inventory of buyer location (Achabal et al., 2000, Disney & Towill, 
2003). The costs associated with the above activities are: production cost, distribution cost 
and order setup cost stock maintenance cost and outsourcing cost if applicable. 
Cost functions of the vendor  
Production and distribution cost 
Let ‘δi’ be the amount spent by a single vendor for producing a single unit. Then, the cost of 
production to meet the jth customer becomes ‘δiyj’. Distribution cost is the product of flow 
and transportation resource cost. Flow cost consists of the direct mileage and carrier contract 
cost per unit form ith vendor of the jth buyer ‘θij’. The transportation resource cost is the 
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indirect cost such as the mode of transport, human router cost and administrative costs and 
termed as ‘γij’ per unit demand for the jth buyer from ith vendor (Dong and Xu, 2002). 
Therefore, the distribution cost = (θijyij)(γijyij). The distribution cost varies parabolically 
depending upon the increase in quantity and mode of transportation. Since in VMI mode, 
the vendor has to monitor inventory and to replenish products as and when required, there 
will be exponential variation in distribution cost depending upon the increase in quantity 
and mode of transportation. 
 PDij =δi yj + γijθij yj2  (2) 
Order and stock maintenance cost 
The vendor monitors the stock status and replenishes the stock. The buyer does not initiate 
orders. Therefore the order / setup cost per replenishment ‘SijVMI’ associated with 
continuously monitoring the stock status is assumed to be the sum of order/setup cost of 
the vendor ‘SSi’ and the order/setup cost of the buyer ‘Sbj’ (Dong & Xu, 2002). Therefore cost 
involved to replenish the batches ‘Qij’ of demand of the jth buyer ‘yj’ is given as Order / 
setup cost for replenishment = ((SSi + Sbj)yj/Qij). 
Inventory, whatever is the mode of operation, is held at both vendor and buyer locations HSi 
and Hbj are the cost of holding one unit per unit time at the ith vendor and the jth buyer’s 
location respectively. In order to replenish Qij to buyer ‘j’ the vendor ‘i’ accumulates this 
before delivery. Therefore the vendor ‘i’ holds an average inventory of Qij/2 to replenish 
buyer ‘j’ and VMI cost of holding inventory (HijVMI) becomes the sum of HSi and Hbj (Dong & 
Xu, 2002).  Therefore the stock maintenance cost is given as (HSi+Hbj) Qij/2.             
Thus the order and stock maintenance cost OSMij of the vendor is the sum of the order setup 
cost and the average inventory holding cost and is as follows: 
 OSMij = (SSi + Sbj)yj/Qij + (HSi+Hbj) Qij/2   (3) 
In this mode of operation the replenishment process takes place instantaneously, therefore 
to minimize the OSMij, Economic Order Quantity (EOQij) for buyer is determined by 
equating the first differential of OSMij to zero. 
d(OSMij)/dQj = 0 
 EOQ ij = [2(SSi+Sbj)yj / (HSi+Hbj)] 1/2 (4) 
Substituting EOQj for Qj, in equation (3) 
 OSMij =[2(HSi+Hbj)(SSi+Sbj)yj]1/2 (5) 
Outsourcing cost: 
Whenever, the aggregate sales quantity ( y
j
n
j
∑
=1
) of all the buyers exceeds the capacity ‘C’ 
of the vendor, then the vendor has to outsource the extra quantities ‘oy’ ( = y
j
n
j
∑
=1
-C). It is 
assumed that an additional cost incurred for vendor to outsource a unit is ‘ǈ’ times of unit 
production cost ‘δ’. 
There fore outsourcing 
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 oc = ǃηδ ( y
j
n
j
∑
=1
-C)    (6) 
Where, 
 ǃ =1, if ( y
j
n
j
∑
=1
-C) >0  (7) 
 ǃ =0, if ( y
j
n
j
∑
=1
-C) <0  (8) 
In case of multiple buyers, the outsourcing cost is equally distributed to each buyer when 
calculating the vendor profit and contract prices for individual buyer ‘j’ which is given as, 
For ‘n’ number of buyers outsourcing cost 
 ‘ocj’ = ǃηδ ( y
j
n
j
∑
=1
-C)/n  (9) 
The profit of Vendor ‘Psj’ when supplying the product to jth buyer is the difference between 
revenue to the vendor and the total cost involved, which is represented as  
 Psj = Wij yj – PDij – OSMij – ocj    (10) 
Therefore the total profit to the vendor Ps by supplying the products to all buyers is as 
follows: 
 Ps= ∑
=
n
1j
sjP = ∑
=
n
1j
{ Wij yj–(δi yj +γijθij yj2)-[(2(Hi jVMI)(SijVMI)yj)½-((ǃηδ( y
j
n
j
∑
=1
-C))/n)]}  (11)  
3.1.2 Buyer operation and costs 
The buyer acts as an agent for the vendor and provides space to sell the products. Since the 
buyer deals with multiple products, maintenance costs are assumed to be negligible for a 
single product. Therefore the only cost associated with the buyers in VMI mode is the cost of 
purchase which depends on contract price. It is generally believed that acceptable (fair) 
pricing to the partners involved is an important factor for better relations in VMI and it 
requires acceptable contract price to be agreed that would satisfy both the vendor and the 
buyer (Grieger, 2003). The main focus of revenue sharing is to share the revenues/profits 
‘PRij’ generated based on the assignments and responsibilities in order to avoid the conflict 
between SC partners (Maloni & Benton, 1997). This reveals that revenue sharing between 
vendor and buyer plays a vital role in fixing the contract price. Thus the profit of a buyer 
‘Pbj’ in VMI mode is the difference between sales revenue and the cost of purchase and is 
represented as: 
 Pbj = P(yj)yj – Wij yj (8) 
Substituting P(yj) from equation 1 , 
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 Pbj = (aj– bjyj) yj – Wij yj (9) 
For the known revenue share ratio (PRij = Psj / Pbj) between the vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ the 
contract price can be derived as:          
∑
=
+÷+++=
n
j
jjVMIjjjj
yyyy
1
j
 ½
jjVMIj
2
j
2
jjjjjij ])PR(1[ C))/n)]}-(((ß- )y )(S )[(2(H  PRy b - PRy{aW ηδθγδ (10) 
4. Objective 
The turnover and profit of an organisation depend on the price and demand of its products. 
The reasons for the non purchase of preferred commodities by customers are: 59% too 
expensive; 8% disliked appearance; 12% shelf life too short and 3 % inconsistent quality 
(Tronstad, 1995). Most of the models on pricing focus on profit generation at single level 
(Rajan et al., 1992; Gallego & Vanryzin, 1994; Polatoglu, 1991; Desarbo et al., 1987). 
Manufacturers fix price to the wholesaler which is known as supply price, considering 
manufacturing and distribution costs. Wholesaler offers a price to the retailer based on 
money turnover / commission. The retailer sells at a price depending upon market 
conditions. Hence pricing is an essential component of a product which makes customer 
more sensitive. Rather, trial and error method is often followed in organizations which 
involve finding out customer demand and other influential parameters such as market 
share, economic conditions, manufacturing capacity, nature of the product, inventory costs, 
cyclic fluctuations in cost and demand and rapid deterioration of product. Pricing 
mechanism differs with nature of the product (perishable, storable, seasonal, etc.,), 
government regulations (duties, licensing, etc.) and type of market (monopoly, oligopoly 
etc.) (Klastorin, 2004). The conventional trial and error pricing mechanism may not yield 
fruitful solution to SC scenario, in which all the entities need to work together in order to 
meet the global competition (i.e., between supply chains) in the market for long term (Casati 
et al., 2001). Under the light of the stated issues, this chapter deals with the pricing 
mechanism in a SC models. 
Two vital parameters that govern the operation of a SC are: sales price at buyers market and 
contract price between vendor and buyer. Sales price is significant in the sense that it 
determines the overall profit of the supply chain, referred here as channel profit. The 
existence of partnership relies on contract price.  It is generally believed that pricing 
acceptable (fair) to the partners involved is an important factor for better relations in VMI 
and that it requires optimal sales and contract prices that would satisfy both vendor and 
buyer (Grieger, 2003). No partner would compromise on due share of profit. Besides, 
revenue sharing is the concept in which total channel profit should be allocated among SC 
participants in different profit ratios (Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo, 2004). The main focus of 
revenue sharing is to share the revenues/profits generated based on the assignments and 
responsibilities in order to avoid the conflict between SC partners (Maloni & Benton, 1997). 
Min & Zhou (2002) pointed out that profit sharing is believed as one of the major 
behavioural (soft) issues in strengthening the relationship between partners of SC to 
improve the performance. Gjerdrum et al. (2002) pointed out that fair optimized profit 
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distribution between the partners would lead to better relationship and only this kind of 
distribution can be the genuine deal 
In general the contract price dictated by the vendor will be higher for most acceptable (fair) 
product for which demand is high, since there is low risk involved to the buyers and 
therefore the revenue share to the vendor will be normally high or equal. On the other hand, 
for the newly launched product, contract price dictated by the vendor will be meager, since 
the buyer takes the responsibility of promoting the sale of the product and therefore the 
revenue share to the buyer will be very high. This reveals that the contract price plays a vital 
role in VMI context of revenue sharing. Moreover, fixation of contract price for the different 
revenue ratio is a tedious process, which leads to conflicts between partners if it is not 
properly adopted (Gjerdrum et al., 2002).  It is evident from the above discussion that the 
contract and sales prices, which determine the profits of buyer, vendor and channel (sum of 
buyer and vendor profit), are the key parameters for the successful adaptation of VMI.. 
Members of SC addressed as partners, promote and adopt strategies to minimize cost or 
maximize turnover. The traditional objective of the supply chain is to minimize total supply 
chain cost to meet the given demand. Researchers argue that total cost minimization is an 
inappropriate and timid objective for the firm to pursue when it analyses its strategic and 
tactical supply chain plans (Shapiro, 2001; Gjerdrum et al., 2002). Instead maximization of 
net revenue could be considered as appropriate objective to supply chain. In the literature 
on Supply Chain Management (SCM), the net revenue is addressed as channel profit Pc’. 
Therefore determination of optimal sales quantity (yjopt) for each buyer j, which maximizes 
the Pc’ becomes the objective of this chapter. The sales price P(yjopt) and contract price Wjopt 
could be subsequently derived with the ‘yjopt’ obtained through various heuristics. 
Concerning the above, this chapter determine the optimal prices (contract and sales prices) for 
maximum channel profit in SC models operating under VMI mode of operation.  
The objective of VMI systems, in general are: inventory reduction and increased 
responsiveness. Both of them are aimed to increase the channel profit (ethical optimisation). 
Besides, a fair revenue share between vendor and buyer would strengthen the partnership 
in SC model. These two factors (channel profit and revenue share) are considered as the 
objectives of the model.  The problem is stated as:  
Determination of  
i. optimal combination of sales quantity‘ yjopt’ (for ∀j) for maximum channel profit ‘Pc’ of 
two echelon supply chain operating in VMI mode of operation and 
ii. Operating parameters such sales prices ‘P(yj)’ (for ∀j) corresponding to ‘yjopt’ and 
acceptable contract prices Wj (for∀j) under different revenue shares ‘PRj’(for ∀j) and 
outsourcing quantity ‘oy’ for vendor (if applicable),given the following: 
• production cost per unit ‘δi’(for ∀i) 
• flow cost per unit ‘θij’ (for ∀i, for∀j) 
• intercept ‘aj’ (for ∀j) of demand function  
• cost slope ‘bj’ (for ∀j) of demand function  
• order / setup cost of vendor ‘Ssi’(for ∀i) and buyer ‘Hbj’ (for ∀j) 
• holding cost of vendor ‘Hsi’ (for ∀i)and buyer ‘Hbj’ ( for ∀j) 
• capacity of the vendor ‘Ci’(for ∀i) 
• Outsourcing cost constant ‘η’ 
• sales quantity range yjmin and  yjmax (for ∀j) and 
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• revenue share ratio ‘PRij’(for ∀I ,for ∀j) between vendor and buyer. 
4.1 Mathematical model for SV_SB 
The mathematical model for SV_SB is given below 
4.1.1 Optimal sales quantity 
Maximize 
 Pc= {Wy – (δ y+γ θ y2) -[(2(HVMI)(SVMI)y)½]} (11) 
Subject to: 
 ymin ≤  y ≤   ymax (Buyer sales quantity constraints) (12) 
 ymin ≤ C   ≤  y max    (Vendor capacity constraints)  (13)                        
 yj     ≥ 0    (Non-negative Constraint & Integer)  (14) 
The solution to the above problem provides the optimal sales quantity ‘yopt’  
4.1.2 Optimal sales price 
Optimal sales price is calculated by using equation (1) 
 P (yopt) = a– bjyopt .  (15) 
4.1.3 Acceptable contract price 
The acceptable contract price ‘Wopt’ is arrived at by substituting the optimal sales quantity 
‘yopt’ in the equation 
 opt
optVMIVMIoptopt ySHyy
y  PR)  (1
))((2 PRy b - PRay 
 W
22
opt
opt +
] (+  ++=
1/2γθδ
  (16) 
 
4.2  Mathematical model for SV_MB 
The mathematical model for SV_MB is given below 
4.2.1 Optimal sales quantity 
Maximize  
 Pc= a
n
j
∑
=1
{ j yj –bjyj2 – δyj – γjθj yj2 – [2(HjVMIj) (SjVMI) yj ]1/2}  (17) 
Subject to: 
 yjmin ≤  yj ≤   yjmax    (for ∀j) (Buyer sales quantity constraints)  (18)  
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∑
=
n
j 1 yjmin ≤ C   ≤  
∑
=
n
j 1 yj max     (Vendor capacity constraints)  (19)  
 yj     ≥ 0    (Non-negative Constraint & Integer)   (20) 
The solution to the above problem provides optimal sales quantity ‘yjopt’ (for ∀j) 
4.2.2 Optimal sales price 
The optimal sales price (P(yjopt)) is derived by substituting the optimal sales quantity (yjopt) in 
equation (1) as furnished below. 
 P(yjopt) =  aj– bjyjopt   (21) 
4.2.3 Acceptable contract price 
The acceptable contract price ‘Wjopt’ is derived by substituting the optimal sales quantity 
‘yjopt’ in the equation (10). 
 
(22)
4.3 Mathematical model for SV_MBO 
The mathematical model for SV_MBO is given below 
4.3.1 Optimal sales quantity 
 Max Pc= a
n
j
∑
=1
{ jyj–bjyj2–δyj–γjθjyj2–[(2(HjVMI)(SjVMI)yj)1/2-((ǃηδ( y
j
n
j
∑
=1
-C))/n)]}   (23) 
Subject to 
 yjmin ≤  yj ≤   yjmax   (∀j)  (Buyer demand constraints) (24) 
 yj     ≥ 0    (Non-negative Constraint & Integer) (25) 
The solution to the above problem provides the optimal combination of sales quantities ‘yjopt’ 
(∀j). 
4.3.2 Optimal outsourcing quantity 
Optimal outsourcing quantity is difference between sums of all buyers’ optimal sales 
quantity and the capacity of the vendor which is given as, 
 oyopt = ∑
=
n
1j
{  yjopt} - C    if   β =1  (26) 
 =0             if       β =0  (26a) 
jopt
jopt VMIVMIjoptjjopt ) y SjHjyy
y  )PR  (1
) )((2 PRy b - PRy a   
  W 
j
2
j
2
joptjjjoptj 
opt j +
  (+γj ++= 1/2 θδ
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4.3.3 Optimal sales price 
Optimal sales price is calculated by using equation (1) 
 P (yjopt) = aj– bjyjopt (∀j).  (27) 
4.3.4 Acceptable contract price 
The acceptable contract price Wjopt’ is derived by substituting the optimal sales quantity 
‘yjopt’ and optimal outsourcing quantity ‘oyopt’ in the equation 10. 
 ∑
=
+÷+
+++=
n
j
joptjVMI
joptjjopt
yy
yy
1
jopt
 ½
joptjVMIj
2
jj
2
joptjjoptjjjopt
]*)PR(1[ C))/n)]}-(((ß- )y )(S )[(2(H
  PRy b - PRy{aW
ηδ
θγδ
   (28) 
4.4 Mathematical model for MV_MB 
Sales quantity of the jth buyer ∑
=
=
m
i
ijj xy
1
, where xij is the transaction quantity between ith 
vendor and jth buyer 
4.4.1 Optimal transaction quantity 
Maximize  
 Pc= a
n
j
∑
=1
{ j ∑
=
m
i
xij
1
 –bj ( ∑
=
m
i
xij
1
)2} –∑
=
m
i 1
∑
=
n
j 1
{δixij + γjθij xij2 + [2(HijVMI )(SijVMI )xij ]1/2}  (29) 
Subject to: 
 yjmin ≤  yj ≤   yjmax    (for ∀j)(Buyer sales constraints) (30) 
 
∑
=
n
j 1
yjmin ≤ Ci   ≤  ∑
=
n
j 1
yj max  (for ∀j) (Vendor capacity constraints)  (31) 
 yj     ≥ 0  (Non-negative Constraint & Integer)  (32) 
The solution to the above problem provides optimal transaction quantity ‘xijopt’ (for ∀i, ∀j) 
4.4.2 Optimal sales price 
The optimal sales price ‘P(yjopt)’  is derived by substituting the optimal transaction quantity 
‘xijopt’ in equation (1) as furnished below. Optimal sales quantity of the jth buyer 
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∑
=
=
m
i
ijoptjopt xy
1  
 P(yjopt)= aj– bjyjopt     (33)  
 
4.4.3 Acceptable contract price 
The acceptable contract price ‘Wijopt’ is derived by substituting the optimal transaction 
quantity ‘xijopt’ in the equation (10) 
 
ijoptij
2
ij
2
ijoptjijijoptj
  x)PR  (1
)))((2 PR xb - PRxa 
 +
 (+  ++=
1/2
ijoptijVMIijVMIijoptijjijopti
ijopt
xSHxx
W
θγδ
(34)  
4.5 Mathematical model for MV_MBO 
4.5.1 Optimal transaction quantity 
Maximize Pc = a
n
j
∑
=1
{ j ∑
=
+m
i
)ijOxijx(
1
 –bj ( ∑
=
+m
i
ijOxijx(
1
)2} – ∑
=
m
i 1
∑
=
n
j 1
{δi(xij+Oxij) +γijθij 
 (xij+Oxij)2  + [2(HijVMI)(SijVMI) xij ]1/2+( λi(δiOxij+γij θijOxij2))} (35) 
Subject to: 
∑
=
m
i 1
(xijmin + Oxijmin) ≤ ∑
=
m
i 1
(xij + Oxij) ≤∑
=
m
i 1
 (xijmax + Oxijmax) 
  (for ∀j)   (Buyer sales constraints)    (36) 
 ∑
=
m
i 1
(xij + Oxij) ≥ 0 (Non- negative Constraint & Integer)  (37) 
The solution to the above problem provides optimal transaction quantity ‘xijopt’(for ∀i, ∀j) 
4.5.2 Optimal outsourcing transaction quantity 
The optimal outsourcing transaction quantity is derived as follows: 
 Oxijopt=βij(yj- ∑
=
m
i 1
xijopt);    (38) 
where, 
For every buyer ‘j’ βij =1; if the profit ratio with vendor ‘i’ is lowest; otherwise βij = 0;  
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4.5.3 Optimal sales price 
The optimal sales price ‘P(yjopt)’ is derived by substituting ‘xijopt’ and ‘Oxijopt’ in equation (1) 
as furnished below. 
Optimal sales quantity of the jth buyer  
∑
=
+= m
i
ijoptijoptjopt )OxX(y
1
 
 P(yjopt)= aj– bjyjopt (for ∀j)   (39) 
4.5.4 Acceptable contract price 
The acceptable contract price ‘Wijopt’ is derived by substituting the optimal transaction 
quantity ‘xijopt’ and Outsourcing transaction quantity ‘Oxijopt’ in the equation 10. 
)(x )PR  (1
)( PR)(x b - )PROx(xa 
 
ijoptij
ij
2
ijoptjijijoptijj
ijopt
ijoptijoptiijoptopt
ijopt
Ox
OxxOx
W ++
 +++++= δ  
 
)(x )PR  (1
)())((2)( 
ijoptij
22
ijopt
ijoptijijijoptiiijoptijVMIijVMIijoptijoptijij
Ox
OxOxxSHOxx
++
 ++] (++  + 1/2 θγδλθγ
(40) 
5. Heuristics 
Many well-known algorithmic advances in optimization have been made, but it turns out 
that most of them have not had the expected impact on the decisions for designing and 
optimizing supply chain related problems (Shapiro, 2001). For example, some optimization 
techniques are of little use because they are not well suited to solve complex real logistics 
problems in the short time, needed to make decisions. Also some techniques are highly 
problem-dependent and need high expertise. All the constraints of the problem may not be 
amenable to the mathematical articulation without such an articulation optimization may 
not be possible leaving the decision maker with no choice but to resort to his own 
experience. This adds difficulties in the implementations of optimization algorithms in the 
DSS which contradict the tendency to fast implementation in a rapid changing world. 
Alternatively for many of the problems, since the cost to find an optimal solution is so high, 
heuristic problem solving would suffice.  Therefore, on the one hand there is the need for 
sophisticated logistics Decision Support System (DSS) to enable the organizations to 
respond quickly to new issues and problems faced on the SCM, and on the other hand there 
are advances in the area of heuristics that can provide an effective response to complex 
problems. This provides a fertile ground for applications of these techniques to SCM and 
subsequently of the development of computer based systems to help logistics decisions. 
Well-designed heuristics packages can maintain their advantage over optimization packages 
in terms of computer resources required, a consideration unlikely to diminish in importance 
so long as the size and complexity of the models arising in practice continue to increase. This 
is true for many areas in the firm, but especially to SCM related problems. 
www.intechopen.com
Pricing in Supply Chain under Vendor Managed Inventory 
 
403 
A heuristic algorithm (often shortened to heuristic) is a solution method that does not 
guarantee an optimal solution, but, in general, has a good level of performance in terms of 
solution quality and convergence. To develop a heuristic for a particular problem, some 
problem-specific characteristics must be defined. The problem-specific may include the 
definition of a feasible solution, the neighbourhood of a solution, rules for changing 
solutions, and rules for setting certain parameters during the course of execution (Corne et 
al.,1999; Glover & Gkochenberger, 2001). In fact, some of the most popular commercial 
packages use heuristic methods or rules of thumb. Heuristic may be constructive (producing 
a single solution) or local search (starting from one or given random solutions and moving 
iteratively to other nearby solutions) or a combination (constructing one or more solutions 
and using them to start a local search).  
The area of heuristic techniques has been the object of intensive studies in the last decades. 
Recent advances in heuristic technique include meta-heuristics, which gained widespread 
applications along with the computational power of the computer technology.  A meta-
heuristic is a framework for producing heuristics, such as Simulated Annealing (SAA), 
Genetic Algorithm (GA), Tabu Search (TS), Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO), Ant Colony 
Optimisation (ACO), etc. (Yokota et al., 1996; Costa & Oliveira 2001; Wu, 2001). Meta-
heuristics have many desirable features for becoming an excellent method: in general they 
are simple, easy to implement, robust and have been proven highly effective to solve hard 
problems. Even in their most simpler and basic implementation, the meta-heuristics have 
been able to effectively solve very hard and complex problems. There are several aspects 
which are worth enough to be mentioned. The most important one is the meta-heuristics 
modular nature that leads to short development times and updates, given a clear advantage 
over other techniques for industrial applications.  
The other important aspect is that the amount of data involved in any optimization model 
for an integrated supply chain problem can be overwhelming. The complexity of the models 
for the SCM and the incapacity for solving in real time some of them by the traditional 
techniques force the use of the obvious techniques to reduce this complex issue by data 
aggregation (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000). Therefore, instead of aggregating data to be able to 
obtain a simple and solvable model, but which will not represent well the reality, 
researchers should consider the complex model by using an approximation algorithm. The 
scenario-based approaches can incorporate a meta-heuristic to obtain the best possible 
decision within a scenario. The combination of best characteristics of human decision-
making and computerised model and algorithmic based systems into interactive and 
graphical design frameworks have proven to be very effective in SCM, since many supply 
chain problems are new, subject to rapid changes and moreover, there is no clear 
understanding of all of the issues involved. 
Rutenbar (1989) pointed out that simple heuristics is not capable of solving the hard 
problems with either numerous, contradictory constraints, or complex, baroque cost 
functions with respect to solution quality and execution time whereas meta heuristics such 
as GA and SAA are most suitable. SAA and GA are widely used for combinatorial 
optimization problems in different domains such as location, packing, partitioning and 
scheduling etc. SAA is a technique for combinatorial optimization problems, such as 
minimizing functions of very many variables. Because many real-world design problems 
can be cast in the form of such optimization problems, there is intense interest in general 
techniques for their solution. SAA is one such technique of rather recent vintage with an 
unusual pedigree: it is motivated by an analogy to the statistical mechanics of annealing in 
www.intechopen.com
 Supply Chain: Theory and Applications 
 
404 
solids. GA makes no assumptions about the function to be optimized. All that a GA requires 
is a performance measure, some form of problem representation, and operators that 
generate new population members. This general approach has been applied to many 
difficult and novel optimization problems.   GA’s strength is its robustness, wide domain of 
applicability and global search capability. This modular aspect is especially important in 
implementing a DSS in a firm and the rapid changes that occur in the area of SCM. 
Lourenço (2005) pointed out that meta-heuristics, when incorporated to a DSS for SCM, can 
contribute significantly to the decision process, especially taking into consideration the 
increased complexity of the logistics problems previously presented. DSS, based on meta-
heuristics, are not currently widespread, but it appears to be growing as a potential 
technique to solve hard problems as the one related with SCM. Taking into the above 
concerns, this section proposes decision support heuristics as given below in the table 1 for 
two echelon VMI systems considering the soft issues such as revenue sharing, pricing, real 
time communication, and determines the parameters such sales quantity, sales price and 
contract price between vendors and buyers for all two echelon environments. 
 
S.No Environment Proposed heuristics 
1 SV_SB  Iterative heuristic 
2 SV_MBO SAA based heuristic 
3 MV_MBO GA based heuristic 
Table 1 Proposed heuristics 
5.1. Iterative heuristics for SV_SB problem 
Gjerdrum et al. (2002) addressed a method to fix fair transfer (contract) price in two 
enterprises SC and proposed an approach by applying the Nash bargaining principle for 
finding optimal multi–partner profit levels subject to given minimum echelon profit 
requirement. Fixation of contract price for the different revenue ratio is a tedious process, 
which leads to conflicts between partners, if it is not properly adopted in VMI system. Dong 
& Xu (2002) represented cost functions of VMI in partial differential equation and proposed 
a methodology to determine optimal sales quantity without giving due consideration to 
contract price under different revenue shares and highlighted the benefits of VMI than that 
of traditional mode of operation. In order to mitigate the above limitation, a new 
methodology is required to determine the contract prices for known revenue shares between 
vendor and buyer with the objective of maximizing the channel profit in two-echelon SC 
operating under VMI mode. The procedure should be simple and it can be easily adapted in 
real time by SC managers (Achabal et. al., 2000). On this concern, this chapter proposes an 
iterative heuristic to find optimal contract and sales prices to operate under VMI mode for 
the problem described in section 4.1. Though the iterative approach involves large 
computations, present day computers can solve them within the reasonable time. Besides 
this, the time factor is not much crucial to this type of offline problems.  
The proposed iterative heuristic involves the following two modules: 
• Module 1: Determination of fair contract price (W) for various demands (y) or Sales 
prices (P(y)) on the assumption that they operate independently (i.e in Non VMI mode) 
with fair rewards or acceptable revenue shares. 
• Module 2:  Selection of optimal contract price (Wopt) based on the channel profits in VMI 
mode from various acceptable contract price (W) obtained in module 1. 
Figure 8 illustrates the mechanism of the proposed iterative heuristic.  
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Figure 8. Iterative procedure of the proposed heuristic 
 
Set y = ymin, J=1, Pc’ (y -Δy) = 0
START
Input the constants Hb, HS, SS, Sb, δ, θ, a, b, Δy, ymin,ymax and PRnon-VMI 
Non VMI Mode 
Compute sales price P(y) = a - by
Find fair contract price under Non VMI mode W 
W =[y (PRnon-VMI+1)]
-1{PD + [(HbSby/2)
1/2 (Ss/Sb+ Hs/Hb)]+ PRnon-VMI 
[P(y)y – (2HbSby)
½] }
VMI Mode 
 
Compute Channel Profit Pc’ (y)= P b’+ Ps’ 
STOP 
Determine Profit of Buyer ( Pb’)and Vendor (Ps’ ) under VMI Mode Pb’ 
= P (y) y - W y 
Ps’ = W y - C (y) - [2(SVMI)(HVMI)y] 1/2 
Pc’ (y) > Pc’ (y -Δy) 
Set Wopt = W ; y = y + Δy
PRINT Optimal Quantity yopt 
and their  corresponding Sales 
Price P(yopt), and Contract price 
Wopt 
NO 
J=J+1 
Pc 
’ (y -Δy)  = Pc’ (y) 
J=2 
YES 
NO 
YES
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5.2 SAA Based heuristics for SV_MBO 
Simulated annealing is also an intriguing technique for optimizing functions of many 
variables (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983). It is a heuristic strategy that provides a means for 
optimization of MINP problems those for which an exponentially increasing number of 
steps are required to generate an exact answer (Eglese, 1990).  Simulated annealing is based 
on an analogy to the cooling of heated metals. Ponnambalam et al. (1999) states that the 
algorithm based on SAA, is a generalization of the well-known iterative improvement 
approach to combinatorial optimization problems. A generic procedure of SAA is given 
below in figure 9. The various steps involved in the proposed algorithm are explained 
below. 
5.2.1 Input module 
Table 2 and Table 3 serve as the input data sets to SV_MB problem. They are given as input 
in this module. 
 
Buyer 
Parameters 
1 2 3 ….  j …. n 
Holding cost Hb1 Hb2 Hb3 …. Hbj …. Hbn 
Order / Setup Cost Sb1 Sb2 Sb3 …. Sbj …. Sbn 
Intercept  a1 a2 a3 …. aj …. an 
Cost slope  b1 b2 b3 …. bj …. bn 
Minimum sales quantity  y1min y2min y3min …. yjmin  …. ynmin 
Maximum sales quantity y1max y2max y3max  yjmax …. ynmax 
Revenue Share Ratio PR1 PR2 PR3 …. PRj …. PRn 
Flow cost per unit  θ1 θ2 θ3 …. θj …. θn 
Table 2. Buyer related data 
 
Holding 
cost 
Order / Setup 
Cost 
Capacity Production Cost per 
unit. 
Outsourcing cost 
constant 
HS SS C δ η 
Table 3. Vendor related data 
5.2.2 Initialization module 
Choose an initial temperature, T. The value of T is decided based upon the number of 
iterations to be performed. Here value of T is taken as 450 (Eglese, 1990). An initial set of 
sales quantity of all buyers is generated randomly with binary representation. A set of 9 
digit binary numbers addresses one buyer. Each seed solution comprising of ‘n’ buyers is 
decoded to provide the feasible sales quantity ‘yj’ in integers by interpolating the seed 
information of the binary form with the following guidelines: Zero in all the nine digits 
would correspond to yjmin (i.e. 000000000 ⇒ yjmin) and ‘one’ in all the nine digits would 
correspond to yjmax (i.e. 111111111 ⇒ yjmax). The binary type representation and the physical 
meaning are as shown in figure 10. 
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Figure 9.  Flow chart representation of Simulated Annealing Algorithm process
 
If 
∆Pc >=0
Input Module
   Vendor Data: ,Ci , δi, Hsi, Ssi           (∀i) 
   Buyer Data :  n,  Hbj, Sbj, aj, bj, yjmin, yjmax  (∀j)   ǉij, PRjj (∀j),λ 
Initialisation Module
  Initialize:   T = 450, Iteration (ITN) = 0, α =  0.95, Accept =0 
  Generate: Randomly the sales quantity (yj) of all buyers in binary form with each 
                   data (yj) consisting of 9  digit binary numbers  
 Convert:    Seed in binary form to provide feasible sales quantity in integers by         
                   interpolating the gene  (i.e. 000000000 ⇒ yjmin & 111111111 ⇒ yjmax)
Evaluation Module
Find            :  Total Channel profit Pc and Pc’ 
Find          :  Difference, ∆Pc = Pc’ - PC  
Perturbation Module
Perturbate the sales quantity (Pair wise Perturbation) 
Generate     : two random points t1, t2 for each buyer ‘yj’ 
Exchange   :  binary values present in position t1, t2 for buyer ‘yj’ 
Decode      : Binary data obtained after perturbation Integers (yj’) 
If 
ITN = 100
    Update :  yj = yj’
       Gbest =Pc’ 
If 
rand( ) ≥ 
 exp(-∆Pc/T) 
IF T =20 
YES
YES 
NO
NO 
NO
Set T = ǂT
YES
NO
Accept = Accept ++
Output Module 
Optimal channel profit ‘Pc opt’ : Gbest  
Optimal sales quantity yjopt (for∀j): Corresponding genes of Gbest  
Determine:  
i)    Optimal Outsourcing quantity (oyopt): using  equation (26) based on ‘xijopt’ 
ii)   Sales price P(yjopt) (for ∀j) using equation (27) based  on the optimal quantity ‘yjopt ’ 
iii)  Contract price wijopt (for ∀i ∀j) using equation (28) based on ‘xijopt’ and revenue share  
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Figure 10. Binary representation and meaning 
5.2.3 Perturbation module 
Generate a feasible neighbour yj’ in the neighbourhood region of yj by using perturbation 
mechanism. Pair wise exchange perturbation scheme is used.  Two points are randomly 
generated for all buyers and the binary digits corresponding to the two points are 
exchanged to obtain the new seed. Then they are decoded as above to obtain the feasible 
sales quantity yj’ in integers. 
5.2.4 Evaluation module 
In this module, the sales quantities of all buyers are decoded as above to obtain the feasible 
sales quantity (yj’) in integers and the total channel profit are determined based on the 
following steps. 
Determination of total channel profit:  
The total channel profit (Pc) & (Pc’) is determined for the sales quantity yj and yj’ 
respectively. Then the differences between the two channel profits are determined. 
 ΔPc = Pc’-Pc  (41) 
5.2.5 Update module 
If the difference ΔPc >= 0, accept the neighbour yj’ as seed, assign (Pc’) as Gbest else accept 
the inferior neighbour as seed with probability ‘p’. i.e., rand ( ) ≤ exp (-ΔPc / T). 
5.2.6 Termination module 
Termination criterion is first checked to know whether the pre-determined number of 
iterations is completed.  If it is not completed, it goes to perturbation module otherwise the 
initial temperature is multiplied by factor ǂ to obtain the new temperature, and proceeds to 
next step. Here value of ǂ=0.95 (Ponnambalam et al., 1999). A check is considered to identify 
whether the value of temperature falls below a predetermined value. If the value falls below 
then proceed to output module otherwise go to perturbation module. 
  
1st  gene jth   gene (n-1)th gene nth gene 
X X X X X X X X X 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
               ⇓                       
9 bits                                                         
⇓ 
X – Either ‘0’or ‘1’ 
 
 
yj = yjmin  +                                                                              ( yjmax -yjmin) 
 
↑ Defined as integer 
(169 (Decimal value corresponding to 010101001)) 
(29 (Decimal value corresponding to 111111111)) 
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Figure 11. Structure of proposed GA based heuristics 
Output Module 
Print: 
Optimal channel profit Pc opt : Gbest  
Optimal transaction quantity xijopt  
(for ∀i ∀j):  Corresponding genes f  
Gbest  
 
Determine:  
i) Optimal outsourcing transaction 
quantity ‘Oxijopt’  using  equation 
(38) based on ‘xijopt’ 
 
ii) Sales price P(yjopt) (for ∀j) using 
equation (39) based  on the optimal 
quantity ‘xijopt ’ 
    
iii) Contract price wijopt (for ∀i ∀j) using 
equation  (40) based on ‘xijopt’ and 
revenue share ‘PRij’ 
Is Termination Criterion 
Satisfied? 
Evaluation Module 
 Find:   fitness parameter i.e. ‘fit(c)’ = ‘Pc’ 
 Convert: ‘fit(c)’ to new fitness value suitable for maximization objective  
Input Module 
   Vendor Data: m,Ci , δ i, HSi, SSi           (for∀i) 
   Buyer Data : n,  
Hbj, Sbj, aj, bj, yjmin, yjmax  ( for∀j)  
ǉij (for ∀i,∀j), PRjj (for ∀i,∀j), λi  
New population generation module 
Selection 
Find :Expected frequency of selection ‘p(c)’   
Find :Cumulative probability ‘cp(c)’ 
Generate :random number ‘r’  
Select :chromosome using ‘cp(c)’ and ‘r’ for new 
population  
Repeat :Until the chromosome selected is equal 
to pop_size
Crossover 
Generate:    random no. ‘r’ 
Select parents:  ‘r’ < p_cross  
Cross over operator: Single point crossover. 
Mutation 
Generate: random no.  ‘r’ 
Select:  genes having ‘r’ < p_mut  
Mutate:   genes by replacing ‘ONE’ to ‘ZERO’ 
 & vice versa 
Initialisation Module 
Transaction sales quantity (yj) of all buyers in binary form with a gene (yj) consisting of 9 
digit binary numbers  
generated chromosome to provide feasible sales quantity in integers by interpolating the 
gene information (i.e. 000000000 ⇒ yjmin & 111111111 ⇒ yjmax) 
Set: pop_size (= 2(m*n)) 
Sorting Module 
Sort:  Maximum ‘fit(c)’ of each population and assign it as local best 
Store: Maximum ‘fit(c)’ after all iterations as Gbest 
Allocation Module 
Decode:  chromosome for ‘yj’ (j = 1 to n) 
Allocation: Transaction quantity (xij) between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ based on vendor 
capacity and buyer sales quantity ‘yj’ using north west corner rule 
NO YES 
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5.2.7 Output module 
After completion of all iterations, the Gbest fitness parameter sorted out is considered as the 
optimal channel profit Pcopt and its corresponding yj (for ∀j) becomes sales quantity of all the 
buyers yjopt (for ∀j). Optimal outsourcing quantity is determined using equation 26. Next, the 
optimal sales price P(yjopt) (for ∀j) and optimal contract price Wjopt (for ∀j) corresponding to 
the optimal quantity yjopt  determined using the equations 27 and 28 respectively. Complete 
output obtained is shown in Table 4 for the optimal channel profit Pcopt. 
 
Operating Parameters Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 **** Buyer j **** Buyer n 
Sales Quantity y1opt y2opt y3opt **** yjopt **** ynopt 
Contract price W1opt W2opt W3opt **** Wjopt **** Wnopt 
Sales price P(y1opt) P(y2opt) P(y3opt) **** P(yjopt) **** P(ynopt) 
Optimal Outsourcing 
quantity  
‘oyopt’ 
Table 4. Optimal operating parameters 
5.3 GA Based heuristics for MV_MBO 
The mathematical model formulated for the determination of ‘xijopt’ (for ∀i, ∀j) to the 
MV_MBO belongs to Mixed Nonlinear Integer Programming (MNIP) problem. The 
objective function is nonlinear involving ‘n’ mixed integer variables and one linear 
constraint for sales quantity of buyers. The Hessian matrix of the objective function confirms 
the nature of it as non-convex (Ravindran et al., 2000). LINGO optimization solver can be 
used to solve such MNIP problem of smaller in size. Yokota et al. (1996) presented the 
usefulness of GA for MNIP problems to provide optimal or near optimal solutions. Costa & 
Oliveira (2001) addressed that evolution strategies such as GA, SAA and ES are emerging as 
the best algorithm for MNIP problems. Mccall (2005) stated that one of the most attractive 
features of the GA is its flexibility on handling various objective functions with fewer 
requirements for fine mathematical properties. Taking into account the above concerns, GA 
based heuristics is proposed to evolve optimal or near optimal transaction quantity ‘xijopt’ (for 
∀i, ∀j) for maximum channel profit to the MV_MBO model. The optimal Outsourcing 
transaction quantity ‘Oxijopt’, optimal sales price P(yjopt)  (for ∀j)and optimal contract price 
‘Wijopt’(for ∀i, ∀j)  are derived subsequently with the ‘xijopt’ (for ∀i, ∀j) obtained through GA. 
Flow chart given in figure 11. outlines the structure of the various modules of the proposed 
GA based heuristic and are explained briefly in this section . 
5.3.1 Input module 
Table 5 -7 shows the input data sets of MV_MBO problem. They are given as input in this 
module.  
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Buyer 
Parameters 
1 2 3 …. j …. n 
Holding cost Hb1 Hb2 Hb3 …. Hbj …. Hbn 
Order / Setup Cost Sb1 Sb2 Sb3 …. Sbj …. Sbn 
Intercept a1 a2 a3 …. aj …. ajn 
Cost slope b1 b2 b3 …. bj …. bn 
Minimum sales quantity y1min y2min y3min …. yjmin …. ynmin 
Maximum sales quantity y1max y2max y3max  yjmax …. ynmax 
Table 5. Buyer related data 
 
Vendor 
Parameters 
1 2 3 …. i …. m 
Holding cost HS1 HS2 HS3 …. HSj …. HSm 
Order / Setup Cost SS1 SS2 SS3 …. SSj …. SSnm 
Capacity C1 C2 C3 …. Ci …. Cm 
Production cost per unit δ1 δ2 δ3 …. δi  δm 
Outsourcing cost parameter λ1 λ2 λ3 …. λi …. λm 
Table 6. Vendor related data 
 
Buyer  
Parameters 
 
Vendor 
1 2 3 …. j …. n 
1 PR11 PR12 PR13 …. PR1j …. PR1n 
i PRi1 PRi2 PRi3 …. PRij …. PRin Revenue Share Ratio 
m PRm1 PRm2 PRm3 …. Pmj …. PRmn 
1 θ11 θ12 θ13 …. θ1j …. θ1n 
i θi1 θi2 θi3 …. θij …. θin Flow cost per unit 
m θm1 θm2 θm3 …. θmj …. θmn 
Table 7. Common data between vendor and buyer 
5.3.2 Initialization module 
This module generates the chromosomes of initial population. Each chromosome ‘c’ 
represents the randomly generated sales quantities of all buyers with the jth gene indicating 
the sales quantity ‘yj’ of buyer ‘j’. The procedure for initialisation of random sales quantity of 
all buyers is similar to the one expressed in section 5.2.2.   
The size of the population depends on the feasible solution space of the problem, which is 
normally dependent on the number of decision variables (Michalewicz, 1994). Under this 
consideration, the population size (pop_size) is set as the twice the number of buyers (i.e. 
pop_size =2n).  
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5.3.3 Allocation module 
In this module, the transaction quantities are allocated between the vendors and the buyers 
basing on the following steps 
i. Decoding of chromosomes: The chromosome ‘c’ is decoded to provide feasible sales 
quantity (yj) (for ∀j) 
ii. Allocation of transaction quantity: Transaction quantity (xij) are allocated between vendor 
‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ based on vendor capacity (Ci) and buyer sales quantity (yj) using north 
west corner rule.  
5.3.4 Evaluation module 
In this module, the population is evaluated and the probability of selection of each 
chromosome is found out. Maximisation of channel profit Pc’ is considered as an evaluation 
criterion. Each and every chromosome is tested for its fitness based on the following steps 
given below for the next generation.   
i. Determination of fitness parameter value: The fitness parameter ‘fit(c)’ is the channel profit 
Pc and is calculated using equation (35) for chromosome ‘c’ by substituting the feasible 
sales quantities ‘yj’ 
ii. Conversion of fitness parameter value to new fitness parameter value:  This step converts the 
fitness parameter to a new fitness value ‘newfit(c)’ suitable for the maximization 
objective and scaling them high, so that a very few extremely superior individuals 
would be selected as parents too many times. Selecting the best conversion function can 
be some what problem dependant. However, one function that has been found to 
generally useful is the exponential (Masters, 1993).    
i.e.,           new fit(c) = e kfit(c)  (42) 
Where k is constant and the value of the constant is usually set by trails in order to scale the 
fitness function reasonably to retain at least half of the good chromosomes in the population 
find place in the new population. Hence the new fitness parameter value is set as:  
 new fit(c) = e0.0005fit(C  (43) 
iii. Conversion of new fitness to an expected frequency of selection: The final evaluation step is to 
convert the new fitness parameter to an expected frequency / probability of selection 
(p(c)) of chromosome ‘c’ by the sum of the new fitness values of all chromosomes. 
i.e.,  p(c) = new fit(c) /  ∑=
=
pop_sizec
1c
newfit(c)   (44) 
5.3.5 Sorting module 
In this module, the maximum fitness parameter is sorted out for each population and it will 
be stored as the local best. The maximum value is sorted out after all iterations and it is 
stored as the Global best. 
5.3.6 Termination criterion 
Termination criterion is checked after sorting module to know whether the pre-determined 
number of iterations is completed.  On its completion, the algorithm passes to the output 
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module, otherwise, the new set of population is generated as given in the new population 
generation module. The number of generations (iterations) depends upon the nature and 
size of the problem and is fixed by user. 
5.3.7 New population generation module 
Selection of next population is based on survival probability, crossover to produce children 
and mutation to induce external influence in new generation. 
5.3.7.1 Selection module 
The next population of the same size is obtained with random selection with the help of a 
roulette wheel procedure of which is explained here below. First the cumulative 
probabilities of selection / survival ‘cp(c)’ of all the chromosomes are found out.  
i.e.,         cp(c)  =  ∑=
=
cc
c 1
p(c)  (45) 
Then the random number ‘r’ between 0 and 1 is generated and a chromosome ‘c’ is selected, 
satisfying the following condition: 
 cp(c )   ≥    r   >    cp(c-1)  (46)  
This selection process is repeated as many times as equal to population size. This method 
used here is more reliable because, it guarantees that most fit individuals will be selected, 
and that the actual number of times each chromosome selected will be within one of its 
expected frequency. This procedure enables fit chromosome to get multiple copies and the 
worst chromosome to die off. 
5.3.7.2 Crossover module 
This involves two steps, viz., (i) selection of chromosome for crossover and (ii) cross over 
operation. Probability of crossover ‘p_cross’ is a vital parameter in cross over operation. The 
value for p_cross is assumed as 0.6 so that atleast 60 % of chromosomes selected in the earlier 
selection module will undergo crossover operation and produce offspring. The procedure 
for this selection is as follows: Random numbers between 0 and 1 are generated for all 
chromosomes, and those chromosomes with random numbers less than p_ cross value are 
the chromosomes selected for crossover. If the number of selected chromosomes is odd, then 
the above procedure is repeated until one more chromosomes get selected and the number 
of selected chromosomes becomes an even number.  
The next step is to carry the crossover operation, a reproduction method. There are so many 
cross operations (Michalewicz, 1994). This work uses simple single point cross over. In 
which a cutting point is introduced at random, which splits the selected chromosomes into 
two parts into left and right. The right parts of the parent chromosomes are swapped to 
produce two new off springs. This process is continued for all the chromosomes selected for 
crossover. 
5.3.7.3 Mutation module 
The purpose of mutation is the introduction of new genetic material, or the recreation of 
good genes that were lost by chance through poor selection of mates. To do this effectively, 
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the effect of mutation must be profound. At the same time, the valuable gene pool must be 
protected from wanton destruction. Thus, the probability of mutation ‘p_mut’ should be tiny 
(Masters, 1993). On the above grounds, the value of ‘p_mut’ is assumed as 0.03 in this 
chapter. The procedure followed for mutation is as follows: Random number is generated 
for each gene in the population; the genes that get random number ‘r’ less than ‘p_ mut’ 
undergo mutation; the selected genes are mutated by replacing ‘ONE’ to ‘ZERO’  and  vice 
versa. 
5.3.8 Output pricing module 
After completion of all iterations, the ‘global best’ fitness parameter sorted out is considered 
as the optimal channel profit ‘Pcopt’ and its corresponding optimal sales quantity of all buyers 
is ‘yjopt’. This module derives the optimal sales price ‘P(yjopt)’ and acceptable contract price 
‘Wjopt’ for the optimal quantity ‘yjopt’ determined from the previous module. Sales price for 
each buyer is calculated using the equation (39) and contact price for each buyer is 
calculated using equation (40). Complete output obtained is shown in Table 8 for the 
optimal channel profit ‘Pc opt’. 
 
Buyer 
1 j n 
 
Operating 
Parameters 
xij Oxij Wij xij Oxij Wij xij Oxij Wij 
1 x11opt Ox11opt W11opt x1jopt Ox1jopt W1jopt X1nopt Ox1nopt W1nopt 
i xi1opt Oxi1opt Wi1opt xijopt Oxijopt Wijopt xinopt Oxinopt Winopt 
 
Supplier 
m xm1opt Oxm1opt Wm1opt xmjopt Oxmjopt Wmjopt xmnopt Oxmnopt Wmnopt 
Demand y1 yj ymn 
Sales price P(y1opt) P(yjopt) P(ynopt) 
Channel 
profit 
 
Pcopt 
Table 8. Optimal operating parameters 
6. Illustration 
This section illustrates the GA based heuristic proposed for MV_MBO model with a pilot 
study data from agricultural development offices situated at three rural places of south 
India. The landowners (vendor) supply rice grains to these agricultural development offices. 
The agricultural development offices (buyers) supply their products (rice grains) to the 
customers. This section illustrates the proposed methodology only with 2 vendors and three 
buyers and it can as well be extended, to ‘m’ vendors and ‘n’ buyers. The vendor is currently 
operating in independent mode where the buyers initiate the orders everyday. Based on the 
orders, the vendors supply the required quantities to buyers. Table 9, 10 and 11 provide the 
buyer related data, vendor related data and the common data between vendor and buyers 
respectively. 
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yj 1 2 3 
Hbj 2 1 2 
Sbj 5 5 7 
aj 23 22 21 
bj 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 
yjmin 1000 2000 1000 
yjmax 2000 3000 3000 
Table 9. Buyer related data 
 
i Hsi Ssi Ci δi λi 
1 2 10 3000 15 0.2 
2 1 9 3000 16 0.2 
Table 10. Vendor related data 
 
j  
Parameters 
 
I 
1 2 3 
1 1.2 1.1 1.3 PRij 
 2 1.2 1.2 1.1 
1 0.004 0.002 0.005 θij 
 2 0.005 0.003 0.002 
Table 11. Common data between vendor and buyer 
Various modules of the GA heuristic are shown in Tables 12 to 19 respectively, and the 
optimal parameters for the case problem are shown in Tables 20. The GA parameters used 
are as follows: chromosome length = 27, pop_size =12, p_cross = 0.6, p_mut=0.03, number of 
iterations = 100. 
 
c Chromosomes 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
2 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
3 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
5 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
7 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
9 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
10 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
11 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
12 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Table 12. Initial population of chromosomes 
www.intechopen.com
 Supply Chain: Theory and Applications 
 
416 
yj c 
1 2 3 
fit(c) newfit (c) P (c) 
1 1504 2919 1911 22527.23 32621.34 0.056 
2 1168 2373 1336 23073.63* 45517.29 0.079 
3 1841 2788 2475 22706.20 53400.18 0.092 
4 1984 2493 2577 22150.13 45697.27 0.079 
5 1923 2183 1183 22398.5 51181.93 0.088 
6 1761 2185 2432 22222.8 58623.6 0.101 
7 1446 2111 2565 21979.21 72326.35 0.125 
8 1833 2864 2714 21989.09 30547.52 0.053 
9 1956 2722 1046 21627.15 65408.42 0.113 
10 1931 2144 2714 21098.45 50323.69 0.087 
11 1426 2524 2189 21765.37 16496.19 0.028 
12 1350 2735 2585 21542.8 53027.41 0.092 
*Local Best 
Table 13. Parameters for the generation of new population 
c cp(c) R Selected 
1 0.056 0.21 1’ (9) 
2 0.135 0.03 2’ (3) 
3 0.228 0.21 3’ (3) 
4 0.308 0.97 4’(7) 
5 0.397 0.91 5’(9) 
6 0.499 0.66 6’(3) 
7 0.624 0.51 7’(7) 
8s 0.677 0.11 8’(7) 
9 0.791 0.78 9’(9) 
10 0.879 0.9 10’(9) 
11 0.907 0.28 11’(3) 
12 1 0.9 12’(7) 
Table 14. New population before crossover and mutation 
C’ r S /NS* 
1’ 0.62 NS 
2’ 0.44 S 
3’ 0.86 NS 
4’ 0.79 NS 
5’ 0.12 S 
6’ 0.99 NS 
7’ 0.93 NS 
8’ 0.24 S 
9’ 0.75 NS 
10’ 0.71 NS 
11’ 0.01 S 
12’ 0.91 NS 
*S: Selected / NS: Not Selected 
Table 15. Selection of chromosome for crossover 
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c’ Parents 
2’ 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
5’ 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
8’ 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
11’ 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Table 16. Parents selected for cross over 
 
c’’ Parents 
2’’ 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
5’’ 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
8’’ 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
11’’ 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Table 17. Off springs of selected parents 
 
c’/c’’ Chromosomes 
1’ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
2’’ 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
3’ 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
4’ 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
5’’ 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
6’ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
7’ 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
8’’ 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
9’ 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
10’ 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
11’’ 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
12’ 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Table 18. Chromosomes after cross over and before mutation 
 
c’’’ Chromosomes 
1’’’ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
2’’’ 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
3’’’ 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
4’’’ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
5’’’ 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
6’’’ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
7’’’ 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8’’’ 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
9’’’ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
10’’’ 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
11’’’ 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
12’’’ 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
* Mutated genes are shown as bold  
Table 19. New Population (Population of chromosome after mutation) 
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Buyer ‘j’ 
1 2 3 
 
Operating 
Parameters xijopt Oxijopt Wijopt xijopt Oxijopt Wijopt xijopt Oxijopt Wijopt 
1 1363 0 20.66 1637 0 19.38 0 0 0 
Supplier ‘i’ 
2 0 0 0 1362 0 20.14 1638 276 19.32 
Sales quantity  1363 2999 1914 
Sales price 22.86 21.4 20.42 
Channel profit 22724.52 
Table 20. Optimal operating parameters 
7. Concluding remarks 
7.1 Summary 
This section reports the robustness of the model and methodology, limitation, in the current 
research, managerial implications and potential scope for future research. This chapter 
addressed to the soft issues of profit sharing and pricing in SCM and has concentrated on 
development of decision support heuristics to determine the optimal or near optimal 
operational parameters (Sales quantities, Prices (sales and contract) and outsourcing 
quantities and transaction quantities) for maximum channel profit to the two-echelon SC 
models operating under VMI mode. 
i. Single Vendor Single Buyer (SV_SB) 
ii. Single Vendor Multiple Buyer’s (SV_MB) 
iii. Multiple Vendors Multiple Buyers (MV_MB) 
iv. Single Vendor Multiple Buyer’s with Outsourcing (SV_MBO) 
v. Multiple Vendors Multiple Buyers with Outsourcing (MV_MBO) 
Furthermore, this chapter illustrated application of VMI systems for two-echelon SC models 
in the agricultural sector. Fixation of contract price for the different revenue ratio is a 
tedious process, which leads to conflicts between partners, if it is not properly adopted in 
VMI system. To overcome the above limitation, a new methodology is required to determine 
the contract prices for known revenue shares between vendor and buyer. Hence, this 
chapter proposes an iterative heuristic procedure for SV_SB model to find optimal or near 
optimal operational parameters. The mathematical formulation of the remaining four 
models (SV_MB, MV_MB, SV_MBO, MV_MBO) belongs to Nonlinear Integer Programming 
(NIP) and Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINP) problems. The Hessian matrix of 
the objective functions confirms the nature of it as non-convex. Hence GA and SAA based 
heuristics are proposed to solve the above models. 
Iterative heuristic procedure provides optimal/near optimal solution when compared with 
the methodology proposed by Dong & Xu (2002) for the same SV_SB operating in VMI 
mode of operation, but under equal revenue share cases. GA and SAA based heuristics 
provides near optimal solution when compared with i) LINGO optimization solver for 
smaller size problems ii) DX methodology of Dong & Xu (2002) by reducing the models (2-5) 
into SV_SB. The computational time increases with increase in number of vendors and 
buyers. However the problem is static and justifiable. 
The robustness of the models are evaluated by changing the influencing parameters such as 
limits on sales quantity, slope of demand function, cost of holding and cost of setup/order. 
Variation in holding and order setup cost has less impact in sales quantities, sales price and 
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contract price, whereas it has more impact on the channel profit. Variations in limits on sales 
quantity and slope of demand pattern have more impact on operational parameters and 
channel profit. Hence it is concluded that the model presented, the heuristics proposed and 
the analysis carried out in this chapter work would aid SC managers to take appropriate 
decision in two- echelon VMI systems. 
7.2 Future directions 
• Inventory holding cost and order setup cost for vendor in all the above models are 
assumed as sum of both holding cost and order setup cost, but in practice the inventory 
cost will be less. Therefore the vendor profit and channel profit would be more in real 
time. Future analysis can consider various combination of inventory holding and order 
setup cost to the above models and the insight of the problem could be studied. 
• The distribution cost in all the models varies parabolically depending upon the increase 
in quantity and mode of transportation. Since in VMI, the vendor has to monitor 
inventory and to replenish products as and when required, there will be exponential 
variation in distribution cost depending upon the increase in quantity and mode of 
transportation. Hence future research can represent distribution cost with respect to 
product and incorporate fixed transportation cost to depict the real cost of 
transportation.  
• All the above models assume reverse linear relationship between price-sales quantities. 
The impact on optimal operational parameters for various demand curves can be 
studied for other categories of product. 
• The mode of operation assumes zero lead time and would not allow backlog and stock 
out. Researchers in future can accommodate these factors along with shortage cost for 
varying service levels while developing two-echelon models.  
• Concept of heuristics proposed for two-echelon models could be extended for multi 
echelon models 
• This chapter illustrated the development of heuristics for sectors like agriculture, but 
this can be extended to any kind of product and service sectors such as milk, 
engineering services etc. 
• Development of knowledge managed systems for two-echelon VMI systems to 
determine operational parameters for maximum channel profit based on the experts 
experience and with the data available from the market. 
• The other soft issues such as organizational resistance to change, inter-functional 
conflicts, team oriented performance measures and channel power shift have not been 
considered while modelling two-echelon SC. Hence future researchers may pay more 
attention to these issues. 
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Nomenclature 
a Constant. 
aj Intercept value for the demand pattern of the jth buyer 
b  Slope of Demand pattern – Selling Price Curve. 
bj Cost Slope of the demand pattern of the jth buyer 
c, c’ ,c’’, c’’’  Chromosome  
C Capacity of the vendor  
Ci Capacity of the vendor ‘i’ 
cp(c ) Cumulative probability of survival 
cp(c-1) Cumulative probability of survival of previous chromosome 
EOQ Economic order quantity  
EOQj Economic order quantity of jth buyer 
EOQij Economic order quantity from ith vendor to  jth buyer 
F Frame work 
fit(c) Fitness function 
Hb Holding cost per unit per unit time of the buyer in independent mode of 
operation. 
Hbj Holding cost of the jth buyer in independent mode  
HS Holding cost per unit per unit time of the vendor in independent mode of 
operation. 
HSi Holding cost of the vendor ‘i’ in independent mode 
HVMI Inventory cost of vendor per unit per unit time in VMI mode of operation. 
HjVMI Holding cost of the vendor in VMI mode 
HijVMI Holding cost of the vendor ‘i’ to jth buyer in VMI mode 
i Vendor identifier (i= 1 to m) 
j Increment factor for sales quantity. 
m Number of vendors 
n  Number of the buyers 
newfit(c) New fitness function 
OSM Order and stock maintenance cost to the vendor for buyer 
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OSMj Order and stock maintenance cost to the vendor for each buyer 
OSMij Order and stock maintenance cost to the vendor ‘i’ for each buyer ‘j’ 
Ox Outsourcing transaction quantity 
Oxij Outsourcing transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ 
Oxijmin Minimum outsourcing transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and buyer 
‘j’ 
Oxijmax Maximum outsourcing transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and 
buyer ‘j’ 
Oxijopt Optimal outsourcing transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and buyer 
‘j’ 
OCxij Outsourcing cost from ith vendor to jth buyer 
oy Outsourcing quantity 
oyopt Optimal outsourcing quantities 
oc Outsourcing cost of the vendor 
ocj Outsourcing cost of the vendor to jth buyer (ocj=oc/n) 
p_cross Probability of the cross over 
P Pricing 
P b Buyer Profit under Independent mode of operation 
P b’ Buyer Profit in VMI mode 
Pbj Profit of jth buyer in VMI mode 
Pc Channel profit in independent mode 
Pc’ Channel profit in VMI mode 
Pc’’ Channel profit obtained after perturbation in Simulated annealing 
∆ Pc Difference in Channel Profit 
Pcopt Optimal channel profit in VMI mode 
Ps Vendor Profit under Independent mode of operation. 
Ps’ Vendor Profit in VMI mode 
Psi Profit of vendor ‘i’ in VMI mode 
Psj Profit obtained by vendor when supplying products to the buyer ‘j’ in VMI 
mode 
Psij Profit obtained by vendor ‘i’ when supplying products to the buyer ‘j’ 
PD Production distribution cost of the buyer. 
PDj Production distribution cost of the jth buyer. 
PDij Production distribution cost from ith vendor to the jth buyer. 
p(c) Probability of survival of chromosome ‘c’ 
p_mut Probability of mutation 
pop_size Population size 
P(y) Sales Price 
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P(yj) Sales price of the jth buyer corresponding to sales quantity ‘yj’ 
P(yopt) Sales price at optimal sales quantity y opt. 
P(yjopt) Optimal sales price of the jth buyer 
PR non-VMI Revenue share ratio between vendor and buyer when they operate under 
non -VMI mode (Ps/ P b). 
PR Revenue share ratio between vendor and buyer when they operate under 
VMI mode (Ps’/ P b’). 
PRj Revenue share ratio between vendor and the jth buyer 
PRij Revenue share ratio between ith vendor and the jth buyer 
Pc’ (y) Channel Profit for quantity y in VMI mode of operation. 
Pc’(y -Δy) Channel Profit of VMI mode for the prior incremental value of sales 
quantity 
Q Replenishment quantity  
Qj Replenishment quantity to each buyer ‘j’ 
Qij Replenishment quantity from vendor ‘i’ to buyer ‘j’ 
r Random number 
Sb Setup cost per order of the buyer in Independent mode of operation. 
Sbj Setup cost of the jth buyer per order in independent mode 
SS Setup cost of the vendor per order in independent mode  
SSi Setup cost of the vendor ‘i’ per order in independent mode  
SVMI Set up cost per order of the vendor in VMI mode of operation. 
SjVMI Setup cost of the vendor per order in VMI mode of operation to buyer ‘j’ 
SijVMI Setup cost of the vendor ‘i’ per order in VMI mode of operation to buyer ‘j’ 
T Temperature 
t1,t2 Random numbers generated in Simulated Annealing for perturbation 
W Contract price 
Wj Contract price between vendor and buyer ‘j’ 
Wij Contract price between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ 
Wopt Optimal Contract price. 
Wjopt Optimal contract price between vendor and buyer ‘j’ 
Wijopt Optimal contract price between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ 
x Transaction quantity 
xij Transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ 
ximin Minimum transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ 
xijmax Maximum transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ 
xijopt Optimal transaction quantities between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’ 
y  Sales quantity 
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yj 
Sales quantity of the jth buyer (i.e.
∑
=
=
m
i
ijj xy
1 ) 
Y 
Aggregate sales quantity of the vendor (i.e. y=
y
j
n
j
∑
=1 ) 
yi 
Aggregate sales quantity of the vendor ‘i’ (i.e. yi=
y
j
n
j
∑
=1 ) 
yj’ 
Sales quantity obtained after perturbation in Simulated annealing of the jth 
buyer 
ymin Minimum expected sales quantity. 
yj min Minimum expected sales quantity of the jth buyer 
ymax Maximum expected sales quantity 
yj max Maximum expected sales quantity of the jth buyer 
yopt Optimal sales quantity. 
yjopt Optimal sales quantity of the jth buyer 
θ Flow cost per unit from vendor to buyer. 
θj  Flow cost per unit from vendor to buyer ‘j’ 
θij  Flow cost per unit from vendor ‘i’ to buyer ‘j’ 
υ Transportation resource cost per unit from vendor to buyer 
υj Transportation resource cost per unit from vendor to buyer ‘j’ 
υij Transportation resource cost per unit from vendor ‘i’ to buyer ‘j’ 
δ Production cost per unit 
δi Production cost per unit for vendor ‘i’ 
ǂ Temperature factor 
ǃ Outsourcing factor 
Δy Incremental change in sales quantity 
βij Outsourcing factor between vendor ‘i’ and buyer ‘j’  
η Outsourcing cost constant 
λ Additional outsourcing cost 
λi Additional outsourcing cost for vendor ‘i’ 
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